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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
unreasonable use issue. By omitting the seventh amendment considera-
tion, the second step of the Justice analysis is unsatisfactory. If the sev-
enth amendment requires a jury trial in a case, then the right to jury trial
outweighs any state rule to the contrary which might be applicable under
Erie.
51
Although the Justice court's analysis of the Erie issue was consistent
with previous Fourth Circuit cases, that analysis was modified, if not
abandoned, by the Supreme Court.52 By going no further than resolving
the Erie issue, the Fourth Circuit failed to address the more important
question of whether use of the federal rule was required by the seventh
amendment.5 3 Byrd requires consideration of the seventh amendment,
5 4
and the seventh amendment requires a jury trial in Justice.55
MARK A. WiLLIm S
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Constitutionally Adequate Safeguards in Commitment Proceedings
One of the most troublesome areas of mental health law centers
around the rights of criminal defendants adjudged not guilty by reason of
insanity.1 After acquittal,2 these defendants often face commitment to
51 The right to a jury trial is superior to a contrary state rule which may be applicable
under Erie. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 92 at 448; see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222
(1963) (per curiam); Smith, supra note 6, at 451; Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projec-
tion, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 248, 268 (1963).
82 See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
23 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
5 See id.
11 See text accompanying notes 45-51 supra.
' See, e.g., In Re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973); American Bar Found.,
The Mentally Disabled and the Law (S. Brakel & R. Rock ed. 1971). The difficulties faced
by the courts in adjudicating the rights of insanity acquittees are the consequence of com-
peting societal values. A strong conflict exists between the public mandate for controlling
deviant behavior and the individual interests of the acquittee. See United States v. Ecker,
543 F.2d 178, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977); Eule, The Presump-
tion of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 673 (1978); Note, Compulsory
Commitment Following Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 409, 411-13
(1962)[hereinafter cited as Compulsory Commitment]. The utilization of uncertain judicial
guidelines for determining the fate of the insanity acquittees has intensified this conflict.
See Schoenfield, Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Mentally Ill - "A Cor-
nerstone of Legal Structure Laid in the Mud," 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1977). Much of the
uncertainty is due to the lack of scientific precision in the area of psychiatric evaluation. See
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 527, 590-626 (1978). However, procedural and constitutional issues have magni-
fied the difficulties included in determining the rights of mentally deficient individuals. See,
e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979) (standard of proof); Baxstrom v. He-
rold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-15 (1966) (equal protection ramifications of commitment proce-
dures); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, -, 221 N.W.2d 569, 574-75, 577-79 (1974) (due
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mental institutions.3 Such commitments may constitute substantial
deprivations of liberty and thus are subject to constitutional scrutiny." A
recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Dorsey v. Solomon,'
reflects responsiveness to the need for constitutionally adequate
safeguards in commitment procedures following acquittal.
In Dorsey v. Solomon, three named plaintiffs brought suit challenging
the constitutionality of Maryland's statutory commitment scheme.' All
three plaintiffs had been involuntarily confined to a state mental hospital
process considerations for commitment); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 134-38 (Me. 1971)
(presumption of continuing insanity); Note, The Insanity Defense: The Need for Articulate
Goals at the Acquittal, Commitment, and Release Stages, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 749-51
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Insanity Defense].
2 One acquitted by reason of insanity is absolved from criminal liability because he has
committed the crime but lacks the autonomy of will to be found guilty. See Note, Commit-
ment and Release Standards and Procedures: Uniform Treatment of the Mentally Insane,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 834 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Treatment]; Insanity De-
fense, supra note 1, at 734. However, some commentators maintain that insanity should not
constitute a defense barring conviction for a crime. See Ringer & McCormack, The Elusive
Insanity Defense, 63 A.B.A.J. 1721, 1722 (1977). Under this view, the insane defendant is
held responsible for the commission of the criminal act, and the lack of free will during the
crime's commission becomes relevant only in regard to the type of punishment or treatment
imposed. Id. at 1724.
The insanity defense differs from a court's determination of incompetency. Incompe-
tency involves the capability of the accused to stand trial and comprehend the nature of the
proceedings against him. The insanity defense focuses exclusively on the accused's mental
state at the time of the commission of the criminal act. See Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d
193, 198 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Statutory standards vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the degree of mental defi-
ciency and dangerousness required for commitment. See Developments in the Law: Civil
Commitment of the Mentally I1, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1201-06 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Developments] (comparison of various statutory standards). Procedural requirements in
statutory commitment provisions also vary. Compare Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306 (1977 Repl. ed.)
(requiring finding of present mental deficiency for commitment) with MD. CODE ANN. art.
59, § 27 (Repl. Vol. 1972) (summary commitment at court's discretion).
See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-11 (1967) (indefinite commitment
under Colorado's Sex Offenders Act held violative of due process); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107, 110-15 (1966) (equal protection); Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192, 1194
(D. Md. 1970) (noting due process requirement of hearing before indefinite commitment).
Unlike prison sentences of definite duration, most statutory commitment schemes allow
commitment for an indefinite period. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1193 n.6. More-
over, involuntarily committed patients do not necessarily have the right to refuse treatment.
Id. at 1194 n.11.
Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979).
Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 729-30 (D. Md. 1977). Maryland's judicial re-
lease statute provides for judicial release only if the patient can show that he does not have
any mental disorder and that he is not dangerous to himself or others. MD. CODE ANN. art.
59, § 15 (Repl. Vol. 1972); see Note, "We're Only Trying to Help" The Burden and Stan-
dard of Proof in Short-Term Civil Commitment, 31 STAN. L. REV. 425, 446 (1979)[hereinaf-
ter cited as Burden and Standard] (noting loss of personal liberty, stigma of commitment,
unwanted medical treatment, future legal disability); Uniform Treatment, supra note 2, at
826 (emphasizing the right to vote, driver's license, and other rights and privileges affected
by commitment); Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968).
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after acquittal of criminal charges by reason of insanity. Court hearings
were not held to determine the plaintiffs' mental conditions at the time of
committal. Bringing suit as a class,' the plaintiffs contended that
Maryland's summary commitment law unconstitutionally permitted the
state to confine insanity acquittees in contravention of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.9
The constitutional challenge focused on the commitment scheme's
lack of judicial safeguards protecting the insanity acquittee's personal
liberty.10 Under Maryland law, the acquitted defendant could be
committed for , a potentially indefinite period without a court
determination of insanity at the time of commitment.11 After committal,
the patient could obtain judicial release only if he could show a lack of
mental disorder and dangerousness. 2 Consequently, the plaintiffs
maintained that equal protection mandated court proceedings for
insanity acquitees similar to those afforded persons civilly committed
under Maryland law.' 3 Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that the
existing commitment procedures violated due process because there was
no requirement that the state affirmatively prove the present insanity of
Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. at 729-30.
8 Id. at 728. The certified class consisted of all persons who, at the time of the filing of
the suit or subsequent to that date, faced commitment or conditional release under Mary-
land law. Id. at 728 & n.1.
Id. at 728; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. at 728.
: See MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 27 (Repl. Vol. 1972). See also note 6 supra.
12 See MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 15 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
13 435 F. Supp. at 730. Equal protection of the law requires that similarly situated per-
sons receive similar treatment under the law. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
In the context of commitment procedures, courts employ equal protection analysis to ascer-
tain the constitutionality of any variations in treatment of persons civilly committed and
those committed as a result of insanity acquittals. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp.
725, 732 (D. Md. 1977). Although equal protection does not require the administration of
uniform commitment methods, the state must justify procedural variations. Id. at 740.
Generally, the courts employ a rational basis test when faced with an equal protection
challenge to a commitment scheme. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 729 (1972)
(utilizing a "reasonable justification" standard); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111
(1966) (some relevance to purpose for which classification is made); State v. Krol, 68 N.J.
236, -, 344 A.2d 289, 296-97 (1975)(continuing mental illness and dangerousness to self or
others). But see Note, Constitutional Standards for Release of the Civilly Committed and
Not Guilty By Reason Of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 233, 267-70
(1978) (discussing the applicability of strict scrutiny, compelling state interest standard);
Developments, supra note 3, at 1330; Note, Commitment Following Acquittal By Reason of
Insanity and the Equal Protection of the Law, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 924, 926 (1968)[hereinaf-
ter cited as Commitment and Equal Protection]. The rational basis test requires merely a
reasonable justification for any disparity in the statutory treatment of similarly situated
persons. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1954). As a result,
courts have inferred that substantially similar jrocedural treatment must be afforded to
civil and criminal commitees. See Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2nd Cir. 1969);
Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, -,
221 N.W.2d 569, 581 (1974); Uniform Treatment, supra note 2, at 832.
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the acquittees upon commitment. 4
Following discovery, the district court approved a stipulation
presented by the parties entitling subsequent acquittees to a prompt
judicial hearing before confinement. 15 The decree obviated the need for
the court to consider whether hearings were required for subsequent
commitments.1" Therefore, the Fourth Circuit addressed only the issue of
whether the right to judicial commitment hearings should be extended to
those persons already summarily committed to state mental
institutions." The Fourth Circuit held that those persons previously
committed under the summary proceeding statute were entitled to
judicial hearings with a proper allocation of the burden of proof.'8 The
court concluded that the state had committed them on a finding of
dangerousness made without due process of law.
In deciding the merits of Dorsey, the Fourth Circuit relied on the
principles found in Supreme Court decisions involving commitment
procedures.' 9 These opinions have been subject to various interpretations
14 Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. at 730. The fourteenth amendment forbids any
state from depriving a person of his liberty without due process of law. U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1. The due process requirement ensures that the integrity of the judiciary's truth
finding function is maintained. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-76 (1971);
State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d 477, 485 (Mo. 1974). Due process is especially relevant in evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of commitment procedures since involuntary commitment involves
a substantial deprivation of liberty. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967); Her-
yford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968). See also note 4 supra.
" Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. at 730-32.
16 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271, 273 (4th Cir. 1979). The Dorsey appeal focused on
the right to judicial commitment hearings while the lower court dealt primarily with the
specific features of such hearings such as the right to counsel, jury, and independent ex-
perts. The district court rejected the request for state appointed independent psychiatrists,
jury determinations, and periodic review hearings. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. at 742.
The plaintiffs did not appeal those determinations.
7 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271, 273 (4th Cir. 1979). Prior to the Dorsey decision,
the criminal defendant who chose to present the insanity defense would file an insanity plea
with the court. MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 25 (Repl. Vol. 1972). If the state failed to prove the
defendant sane but could show that he perpetrated the crime charged, then the state could
summarily commit the defendant. Id. After ninety days, the acquittee could request a re-
lease hearing where the burden to prove lack of dangerousness would be placed on him. Id.
Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271, 273 (4th Cir. 1979).
19 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In Baxstrom, the petitioner was informally
committed to a mental institution upon expiration of his prison term. 383 U.S. at 108.
Under the applicable statutory scheme, persons with past criminal records were entitled to
judicial hearings to determine dangerousness whereas incarcerated individuals were denied
such procedures. Id. at 115. Due to the significant nature of the commitment hearing, the
Supreme Court held that equal protection required that the procedural review afforded
other civilly committed persons must be extended to those nearing the end of their prison
terms. Id. at 110.
In Jackson, the petitioner was a twenty-seven year old deaf mute with a preschool level
of intelligence who was arrested for stealing a few dollars in cash. 406 U.S. at 717. Before
trial, the petitioner was judically committed to a mental institution because of his incompe-
tence to stand trial. Id. at 718-19. In view of the state's lack of adequate treatment facilities,
[Vol. XXXVII
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and may arguably apply only to the particular fact situations at hand or
interpreted as enunciating broad principles of law.20 Although recent
court decisions have been limited to specific factual situations, 21 the
cases, broadly construed, support the proposition that involuntary
commitment involves a substantial deprivation of freedom which must be
subjected to constitutional scrutiny.2 2 Liberally interpreting Supreme
Court holdings, the Fourth Circuit maintained that such deprivations of
individual liberty must be predicated on a finding of dangerousness made
with due process of law.
23
The Fourth Circuit's due process analysis hinged on the significant
restraint of liberty which commitment entails.24 In view of such restraint,
the court maintained that due process requires the state to prove the
necessity for commitment before depriving the acquitted defendant of his
freedom by incarceration in a mental hospital.25 Accordingly, the Dorsey
the commitment amounted to a life sentence in the mental institution. Id. at 719-20. The
Supreme Court held that due process requires that "the nature and duration of commit-
ment have some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."
Id. at 738. The Court further maintained that the petitioner was denied equal protection
since he was subjected to a more lenient commitment standard and stricter release proce-
dures than individuals not charged with an offense. Id. at 730.
The petitioner in Addington was civilly committed following a judicial hearing featur-
ing counsel and a jury. 441 U.S. at 421. Although conceding that he suffered from mental
illness, the petitioner challenged his committal on the basis that the standard of proof uti-
lized in proving his dangerousness was improper. Id. at 421-22. In holding constitutional the
clear and convincing standard, the Court considered the substantial restraint on personal
liberty which results from involuntary commitment. Id. at 425-33.
20 Compare Dower v. Boslow, 539 F.2d 969, 972 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing Baxstrom in deal-
ing with equal protection claim) and Waite v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(cit-
ing Jackson in reference to acquittees) with United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 198 n.83
(D.C. Cir. 1976)(rejecting broad interpretation of Baxstrom) and State ex rel. Schope v.
Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644, -, 173 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1976) (limiting Baxstrom to civil rather
than criminal commitment) and Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1971)(limit-
ing Baxstrom to commitments near end of prison sentence).
" See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); note 19 supra.
22 The varied interpretations of the Supreme Court decisions depend on the manner in
which the fact situations of the cases are treated. For example, Jackson and Baxstrom stand
for the general proposition that commitment procedures must satisfy equal protection and
due process. See Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 274. Through such an interpretation, the
types of commitments involved are viewed as similar in that they involve substantial re-
straints on liberty. However, through a narrow interpretation, the holdings of Jackson and
Baxstrom are limited to incompetency commitments in the former case and commitment
following prison sentence in the latter. See note 19 supra.
22 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 276.
24 Id. at 274.
25 Id. The due process standard is less strict in the cases of emergency commitment or
temporary confinement for examination. Courts, however, have held that a sanity hearing
must be initiated upon completion of the observation period. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (due process required nature and duration of commitment to bear rea-
sonable relation to purpose of confinement); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967)
(indefinite commitment under Colorado's Sex Offenders Act held violative of due process);
Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (commitment without hearing permissi-
ble to determine present mental condition); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, -, 221
1980]
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court found Maryland's summary commitment statute violative of due
process because the state did not have the burden of proving the insanity
of acquittees at the time of commitment.
26
After establishing the due process implications of Maryland's
summary commitment procedures, the Fourth Circuit focused on the
state law to examine whether adequate remedies existed for prior
acquittees.2 7  The Dorsey court found Maryland's judicial release
procedure inadequate because the patient had the burden of proving lack
of dangerousness to himself or others.2 8 The Fourth Circuit maintained
N.W.2d 569, 577 (1974) (same); State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d 477, 484-85 (Mo. 1974) (Seiler, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting due process satisfied by prompt post-commital hearing). See also
Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd mem., 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (hold-
ing no violation of due process in emergency commitment situations). But cf. State v. Alto,
589 P.2d 402, 405 (Alas. 1979) (holding allocation of proof on defendant at commital hearing
not violative of due process).
28 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 274. The due process outcome of commitment litiga-
tion often is determined by the statutory treatment of the insanity defense. In jurisdictions
where insanity is proven at trial, courts have rejected the due process right to judicial com-
mitment hearings, and use a presumption of continuing insanity to justify summary or auto-
matic commitments. Such jurisdictions permit commitment statutes shifting the burden of
proving lack of dangerousness for release to the commitee. See State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d
477, 482 (Mo. 1974); In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 135, 496 P.2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553,
562 (1972) (holding presumption of continuing insanity under California's statutory
scheme); State v. Allan, 166 N.W.2d 752, 758 (Iowa 1969). See also Mills v. State, 256 A.2d
752, 756 (Del. 1969) (holding burden on acquittee proper since he successfully claimed in-
sanity to avoid punishment); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 135 (Me. 1971) (summary com-
mitment justified by possibility of being incapable of controlling behavior); see generally
James, Burdens of Proof, 47 U. VA. L. REV. 51 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Burdens]; Com-
pulsory Commitment, supra note 1, at 409; Uniform Treatment, supra note 2, at 835; Com-
mitment and Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 935.
The presumption doctrine has been justified on procedural grounds since it obviates the
need to have new sanity hearings whenever a return to sanity is claimed or collateral suits
involving the patient are initiated. See Compulsory Commitment, supra note 1, at 423.
However, the presumption doctrine is not adopted in those jurisdictions where the defen-
dant's insanity is not affirmatively proven at trial. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 647
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052, 1057-58 (D.S.D. 1977); People v. Mc-
Quillan, 392 Mich. 511, -, 221 N.W.2d 569, 578 (1974). See also State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d
477, 484 (Mo. 1974) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
27 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 274.
28 Id. The allocation of the burden of proof in commitment proceedings can be disposi-
tive in determining whether the acquittee is to be committed. Generally, in jurisdictions
where the presumption of continuing sanity is not invoked, the majority of the courts and
commentators favor an allocation of the burden to the state. See Waite v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d
392, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (justifying State's burden on account of imprecise nature of
psychiatric testimony); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding that
allocation of burden to acquittee makes it nearly impossible to negate inference of danger-
ousness); Burden and Standard, supra note 6, at 440 (noting evidentiary disadvantages re-
sulting from imposition of burden on patients); Note, Procedural Safeguards for Periodic
Review: A New Commitment to Mental Patient's Rights, 88 YALE'L. REV. 850, 862-63
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Procedural Safeguards]; Note, Due Process for All - Constitu-
tional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 633,
655 (1966). But see State v. Alto, 589 P.2d 402, 405-06 (Alas. 1979) (finding legitimate allo-
cation of burden on acquittee). See generally Burdens, supra note 26, at 66 (allocation
placed on party with readier access to knowledge); see also note 32 supra.
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that reliance on release procedures to remedy the deficient commitment
law fails to satisfy due process because the state is not required to
demonstrate the need for committal.2 9  Since Maryland's release
procedure would not redress the harm caused by the previous
commitments, the Dorsey court mandated the "retroactive" application
of the consent decree to remedy the previous defective procedures by
giving unjustly committed defendants new hearings.30
Although noting that the decision did not involve a question of pure
retroactivity, the Fourth Circuit framed its analysis in those terms.3 1 If
the court had ordered retroactive hearings in the ordinary meaning of the
word "retroactive", the hearings would have focused on the mental
condition of the commitee at the time of acquittal. 32 Realizing the
difficulty in making such a determination, the Fourth Circuit assumed
that any new hearings would focus on the inmate's present state of
mind.3 3 The court maintained, however, that the principle behind pure
retroactivity, to redress prior wrongs that a defective guilt-determining
process produced, was applicable to the issue presented.
3 4
Rather than require new commitment hearings for all persons
summarily committed, the Fourth Circuit modified the lower court's
holding in three ways to lessen the administrative impact of the decision.
First, the Fourth Circuit ordered new hearings for only those commitees
who request them.3 5 Second, rather than require new commitment
Some courts have held that the burden of proof may be allocated to the acquittee if the
statutory procedures adequately safeguard the commitee's interests. See Kovach v. Schu-
bert, 64 Wis. 2d 612, -, 219 N.W.2d 341, 347 (1974), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 1117 (1975)
(finding burden placed on the acquittee during release proceedings as proper since two ex-
amining psychiatrists were appointed); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(placing burden on acquittee in habeas corpus proceedings proper since committing hospital
must assist court in acquiring all relevant information on defendant's condition).
29 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 274.
:0 See note 32 infra.
3I Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 274.
32 Id.
:3 Id.
I' Id. at 275. The basic factor used in determining whether a decision should apply
retroactively is the effect of the decision in redressing wrongs that the defective guilt-deter-
mining process produced. Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 50, 51 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973). Retroactive applications of commitment decisions are influ-
enced by other concerns. Courts apply decisions retroactively where initial commitment cre-
ated continuing effects that could not be remedied by later attack. See Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504, 513 (1972). Courts have balanced the public interest against the gravity of the
effect of commitments to determine whether to require retroactivity. See Heryford v.
Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
The Dorsey court's retroactive mandate is not without precedent. Compare People v.
McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, -, 221 N.W.2d 569, 586 (1974) (granting examination and hearing
rights to some'persons who were denied such procedures prior to court's holding) with Bol-
ton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (giving prospective effect to court's
decision which extended the right to judicial commitment hearing to acquittees). But see
Waite v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392, 395 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (remarking that prospective applica-
tion of Bolton discriminates between pre- and post-Bolton acquittees).
3 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 275.
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hearings, the Dorsey court modified the lower court's decree to allow the
state to substitute the traditional release procedures as long as the
burden of proof on the dangerousness issue shifted from the inmate to
the state."6 Finally, instead of providing new proceedings to previously
committed, conditionally released patients,3 7 the court accepted the
state's assurance that the burden of proof would be shifted to the state if
subsequent recommitment proceedings are initiated.,
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit weighed the interests of
both parties involved. The state has both an interest in protecting society
from dangerous individuals and a duty to see that persons unable to care
for themselves receive adequate attention. 9 Balanced against the state's
interests are the rights of the individual who faces potentially indefinite
incarceration if committed. 0 Recognizing the shortcomings of Maryland's
statutory scheme, the Fourth Circuit tipped the balance in favor of the
patient and attempted to fashion a remedy for the previous damage
caused by the defective statute.
41
The court, however, recognized the potential administrative problems
and expense involved in ordering new hearings for all persons committed
under the defective statute. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, modified the
lower court's grant of new commitment hearings to make the state's
burden less onerous.42 Although intending to preserve the thrust of its
decision, the court diluted its effect by altering the lower court's decree.
The Fourth Circuit restricted the grant of new hearings by making
available the proceedings on a request basis.43 The court maintained that
the committed patients, or someone on their behalf, could be expected to
initiate the procedures. 4 4 The Dorsey court correctly recognized the need
for giving notice to those patients affected by the decision since
inadequate notice could have the practical effect of limiting the
36 Id. at 276.
37 Conditional release occurs when the patient is adjudged capable of returning to the
community with more limited restrictions on freedom. Under such procedures, the patient
may be recommitted if the terms of the release are breached. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, §
28 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
" Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 276.
" The government derives its interest in ensuring the safety of the general public from
the police power of the state. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). See generally
Developments, supra note 3, at 1227-45. In addition, the state justifies commitment of the
mentally ill by its role as guardian of the people. See generally id. at 1207-22.
10 See note 4 supra.
4' Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 275-76.
42 Id. Many courts have faced administrative claims in commitment cases. See Woodall
v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1972) (retroactive application affecting 122 persons);
Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1086-87 (2nd Cir. 1969) (possibility of administrative
burden no justification for failure to provide long overdue relief); Heryford v. Parker, 396
F.2d 393, 397 (10th Cir. 1968) (possibility for wholesale release from institutions is compel-
ling reason for retroactivity). But see Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(prospective application in the interests of justice and administrative convenience).




availability of the new hearings. Without a strict notice requirement,
many patients, isolated in the confines of an institution, will remain
unaware of their rights under the court's decree. 45 Other commitees might
be too mentally deficient or drugged to opt for new hearings. Therefore,
by making available the new procedures on a request basis with an
unstipulated notice requirement, the court, in its pragmatic desire for
economy, might have mollified the thrust behind its holding.
The Fourth Circuit further diluted the impact of its decision by
altering the lower court's order granting new proceedings to conditionally
released patients previously committed under defective procedures. 46
Instead of, granting new hearings to these outpatients, the court accepted
the state's proposition that any subsequent recommitment hearings
would be modified to satisfy the procedural safeguards mandated by the
lower court.47 This change reflects the court's view that conditionally
released patients are not entitled to the same relief granted to those
persons confined in an institution, since the restraint on liberty can be
seen as less restrictive. s
The lesser limitation on freedom, however, is as much a deprivation as
that faced by inpatients because both the conditionally released and the
confined commitee face the same due process deprivation upon
committal. 4 A recommitment procedure which provides the safeguards
required by the lower court is of little benefit to the conditionally
released commitee because the paroled commitee may make use of the
newly refurbished proceedings only by violating the conditions of his
release.50 Thus, for the paroled commitees, the denial of due process in
the initial defective commitment procedures ordinarily-will go unrectified
and contravene the very constitutional safeguards the court is trying to
enforce.
The existence of summary commitment statutes such as Maryland's
mental health law may be traced to the public mandate for keeping all
45 See Procedural Safeguards, supra note 28, at 853-58 (1979).
46 Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 276.
47 Id. The procedural safeguards featured in the revised recommitment hearings in-
clude the right to counsel and a requirement that the state must prove the present insanity
of the acquittee. See Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d at 273-74.
48 Id. at 276. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit cited parole cases when discussing the
restraint on liberty faced by persons conditionally released. Id. at 276 n.5. The parole cases
stand for the proposition that parole constitutes a significant restraint on liberty. See
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242
(1963). Even under Maryland law, a conditionally released patient is deemed to be a re-
tained patient for the purposes of the mental hygiene law. MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 18(b)
(Repl. Vol. 1972).
'1 See note 14 supra.
50 The Fourth Circuit's procedural modification of the recommitment hearings has
'Catch-22' consequences. See Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment,
24 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 22 (1977) (discussing the definitional problems of the dangerousness
standard).
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potentially dangerous individuals off the streets.5 Summary procedures
represent an ill-considered attempt to dispose of society's outcasts by
failing to take into account the fact that the mentally ill acquittees are
entitled to exercise their constitutional rights. Because of the legislative
response to public opinion, the courts must insure that the interests of
the acquittee are adequately protected.
52
In Dorsey, the Fourth Circuit properly determined that Maryland's
commitment procedures were constitutionally defective.5 By applying
the dictates of the consent decree to previously committed acquittees, the
court did not unduly impose on the legislature's function of providing
statutory guidelines. Instead, the Fourth Circuit took the initiative to
alleviate a substantial injustice imposed by the defective commitment
procedures. 54 Thus, Dorsey v. Solomon is consistent with the trend within
the judiciary to expand the civil rights of those persons who face
potentially indefinite commitments in mental institutions.5
CHARLES JUSTER
B. Availability of Medicaid Funded Abortions
An individual's right to abortion is qualified by the state's significant
interest in promoting maternal health and protecting potential life." The
extent of government regulation, however, is a highly controversial issue,
2
, See text accompanying note 39 supra.
52 See American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 556-57
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (urging judicial resistance to majoritarian decision-
making).
" See notes 12 & 13 supra.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
5 See Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612, -, 219 N.W.2d 341, 343 (1974), cert. dis-
missed, 419 U.S. 1117 (1975)(noting trend towards greater protections of individual rights).
' The state's interest varies according to the trimester of pregnancy in which the gov-
ernmental action applies. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); text accompanying
note 20 infra. The interest is minimal during the first trimester of pregnancy but increases
thereafter. The Court, however, has emphasized that the state has a legitimate interest dur-
ing the first trimester to require abortion procedures to be safe and clinically performed.
See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975). The Supreme Cour further defined the
state's legitimate interests in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In Dan-
forth, the Court upheld, as a legitimate exercise of the state's interests, a statute requiring
recordkeeping and the pregnant woman's written consent for the abortion, id. at 67, 80-81,
while rejecting blanket parental and spousal consent requirements. Id. at 71, 74. In addition,
the Court invalidated a statutory provision which would ban saline amniocentesis, because
no reasonable and legitimate maternal health interest could be shown in support of the ban.
Id. at 79.
2 The abortion controversy ranges from the proper forum for dealing with abortion
questions to the permissible degree of government action. Compare Hardy, Privacy and
Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 18 ARZ. L. REV. 903, 937 (1976) (judiciary should defer to legislature) with O'Fallon,
Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 19,
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and state regulation of abortion has been the subject of extensive litiga-
tion.3 Abortion adjudication has generated intense emotionalism because
the court decisions intrude on areas of personal conviction regarding sex-
ual freedom and responsibility. 4 One of the more controversial areas is
the sponsoring of abortions with Medicaid funds derived from the tax-
paying public. In Doe v. Kenley,5 the Fourth Circuit examined the stan-
dards untilized to determine the availability of Medicaid funded
abortions.
Doe v. Kenley arose as a class action challenging Virginia's Medicaid
policy standard for reimbursement and physician certification for state
funded abortions.6 Although the acknowledged purpose of the Common-
wealth's Medicaid program was only to eliminate funding for nonthera-
peutic abortions,7 the Board of Health's policy standard limited reim-
bursements to situations where the expectant woman's life would be
endangered by carrying the pregnancy to term." Consequently, out of
their concern for reimbursement, members of the medical community
hesitated to perform many abortions for indigent women who failed to
satisfy the life endangerment criteria.9 This reluctance of physicians
75-78 (1979) (greater likelihood of corrupt legislative decisionmaking). See also Geary,
Analysis of Recent Decisions Involving Abortions, 23 CATH. LAW. 237 (1978) (pro-life);
Bryn, An American Tragedy: The' Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807
(1973) [hereinafter cited as American Tragedy] (pro-life); Perry, The Abortion Funding
Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEo. L.J.
1191 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Abortion Funding Cases] (advocating publicly funded
abortions).
' Abortion litigation has dealt with virtually every aspect of the abortion question. The
issues decided range from the proper circumstances under which abortion challenges may be
raised, see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), to whether abortion procedures can
be excluded from Medicaid coverage. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (sustaining
state policy excluding nontherapeutic abortions from coverage under Title XIX).
" See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). Both the courts and commentators have
demonstrated emotional responses to the abortion issue. See An American Tragedy supra
note 2, at 807 (pro-life analysis of Supreme Court decisions); Comment, The Moral Interest
of the State in Abortion Funding: A Comment on Beal, Maher and Poelker, 22 ST. Louis
L.J. 566, 578 (noting emotional commitment of several members of the Court).
' 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978).
'Id. at 1363. The plaintiff, a Medicaid recipient, brought suit on behalf of similarily
situated women with medical conditions which fail to satisfy the Board of Health's standard
for reimbursement. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.
1978).
7 584 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1978). The Commonwealth did not dispute the lower court's
policy objective finding. Id. at 1365.
9 Id. at 1363. The Board of Health first expressed the life endangerment standard in a
November 30, 1977 amendment to the State Plan for Medical Assistance. Id. The Board of
Health adopted the standard in response to the passage of the Hyde Amendment which
placed a similar restriction on federal HEW appropriations. Id. at 1363 n.1; see note 27
infra. Subsequent Board of Health directives reiterated the life endangerment standard. See
March 20, 1978 Medicaid Memo, quoted in 584 F.2d 1363 n.2; April 26, 1978 Board of
Health Resolution, quoted in 584 F.2d 1364 n.3; June 19, 1978 Medicaid Memo, quoted in
584 F.2d 1364 n.4.
I Id. at 1363. The plaintiff documented the medical community's reluctance to accept
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provided the basis for the plaintiff's complaint.
During the first trimester of pregnancy, the plaintiff sought a Medi-
caid funded abortion asserting that she would suffer severe emotional
strain and possible physical difficulties if forced to carry the fetus to
term.10 Despite her claim of therapeutic necessity, the Commonwealth re-
fused the request for funding." The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that
the Board of Health's life endangerment policy directives provided the
grounds for refusal to reimburse in contravention of the Commonwealth's
stated objective of excluding payments only for nontherapeutic abor-
tions.12 She maintained that the funding objective and the reimbursement
standard were inconsistent and violative of Title XIX of the Social Secur-
ity Act of 1965,'1 as well as the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
1 4
Upon the filing of the suit, the court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the Board of Health's implementation of the Common-
wealth's funding policy pending an adjudication of the plaintiff's claim.
The Board of Health responded to the court's action by drafting a resolu-
tion reaffirming the agency's sole desire to eliminate abortion reimburse-
ments where no good medical reasons existed under a life endangerment
standard.15 The lower court ultimately found the Medicaid guidelines un-
ambiguous and consistent with both Title XIX and the Constitution."6
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The
Medicaid recipients as patients through statements issued by several Virginia medical cen-
ters. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, 13, Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978).
'0 Brief for Appellant at 5, Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978).
" 584 F.2d at 1364.
12 Id. at 1363.
11 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1397i (1976). The plaintiff's Title XIX claim hinged on the
Act's objective in providing necessary medical services to eligible Medicaid recipients. 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). She maintained that the Board of Health, by implementing the re-
strictive life endangerment standard, eliminated reimbursement for many medically neces-
sary abortions. 584 F.2d at 1363.
1' Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1363 (4th Cir. 1978). The plaintiffs maintained that
the life endangerment standard contravened the fourteenth amendment by unduly burden-
ing their right to privacy concerning the decision to abort. See note 20 infra.
" 584 F.2d at 1364. The April 26, 1978 Board of Health Resolution stated that the
Commonwealth desired to eliminate abortion funding where no good medical reasons ex-
isted, and where no life endangering threat could be demonstrated. Id. at 1364 n.3.
10 Id. at 1364. Viewing the Board's objective as the elimination only of nontherapeutic
abortions, the district court relied on Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), to reject the plain-
tiff's Title XIX claim. Beal involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's federally approved Medi-
caid plan which limited reimbursements to abortions certified as medically necessary.
Through a statutory analysis of Title XIX, the Beal court held that state Medicaid pro-
grams did not have to provide coverage for nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 445.
The lower court found further support in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), to sustain
the Commonwealth's funding policy. In Maher, the Supreme Court focused on the constitu-
tional implications of a welfare policy that limited reimbursements to medically necessary
abortions. The Court upheld the policy on the grounds that no violation of equal protection
resulted from a state's policy judgment favoring the funding of childbirth costs over abor-
tion reimbursements. Id. at 474.
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court held that Virginia could not implement its policy of eliminating
funding only for nontherapeutic abortions by using a standard requiring a
physician certification that the Medicaid applicant's life would be endan-
gered if she carried the pregnancy to term. 17 The court ordered the "life
endangerment" guidelines replaced by a "substantial endangerment of
health" standard which would take into consideration all relevant physi-
cal and mental health factors.'8 In addition, the court directed that ade-
quate notice of the change be given to all Medicaid program
participants.'"
The Supreme Court has played a major role in the formulation of
abortion law. In 1973, the Supreme Court maintained that women have a
right to abortion subject only to the state's interest in promoting mater-
nal health.2 0 The Court stated that the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician is controlling on the decision to abort dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy.2' Subsequent Court decisions, how-
ever, limited the pronounced qualified right to abortion.
In 1977, a series of Supreme Court opinions effectively paved the way
for states to bar indigent women from enjoying the newly established
abortion rights.2 2 The Court distinguished between direct limitations on
abortions and state encouragement of alternative activities to sustain
practices which restricted government funds and medical facilities for
abortions.'
17 584 F.2d at 1363.
1S Id. at 1366. The court's wording change cannot be deemed judicial legislating since
the court made the substitution only for clarification purposes. Furthermore, the immediacy
of the problem lent credence to the court's action. See note 28 infra.
19 584 F.2d at 1366. The Fourth Circuit ordered public notice of the change and the
issuance of a revised policy directive for members of the medical community. Id.
20 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court faced a
constitutional challenge to a state criminal abortion statute making it illegal to procure or
attempt an abortion except in life threatening circumstances. Id. at 117. Although noting
that the right to abort is derived from a right to personal privacy, the Court maintained that
the state has an interest in the abortion decision. Id. at 154. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held that the state must not interfere with medical judgments on abortion during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163. The abortion right, however, is limited in the second
and third trimesters, since the Court recognized that the state has an interest in promoting
maternal health and protecting potential life. Id.
21 Id.
22 See generally Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)(per curiam) (no constitutional violation by City of St.
Louis providing public health services for childbirth while refusing corresponding services
for nontherapeutic abortions); note 16 supra.
23 According to the Court, state resources could be properly redirected toward promot-
ing the state's interst in encouraging normal childbirth. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521
(1977). However, such funding policies could create insurmountable obstacles to indigents
who cannot afford to enter private facilities. See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Economics aside, commentators have noted the inadequacy and unavailability of private
facilities in various parts of the country. See Note, The Effect of Recent Medicaid Decisions
on a Constitutional Right: Abortions Only for the Rich?, 6 FoRDMAM UaB. L.J. 687, 710
(1978). Consequently, the childbirth encouragement policy only encourages indigent women
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In addition to Supreme Court precedent, Title XIX of the Social Se-
curity Act of 196524 is relevant in determining the permissible standards
for abortion funding. The federal government implements its funding of
state Medicaid programs under Title XIX, which requires state programs
to conform to federal standards in order to qualify for federal funding. 5
Conformity is required to ensure that medicaid benefits are equitably
provided and distributed to persons eligible under the Act.26 Although
Title XIX makes no specific reference to abortion, all states desiring to
participate in the federal program must ensure that necessary medical
services are made available.
27
The Fourth Circuit did not discuss Title XIX and the constitutional
implications of the Commonwealth's abortion funding program because
the court viewed Doe v. Kenley as merely involving a question of seman-
to carry pregnancy to term, see Note, Medicaid Funding for Abortions: The Medicaid Stat-
ute and the Equal Protection Clause, 6 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 421, 441 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Medical Funding], and will force indigents to turn to illegal unsafe abortion procedures.
See Note, Abortion, Medicaid and the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 120, 131 n.87, 145-47
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Medicaid and the Constitution]; Note, A Right Without Access?
Payment for Elective Abortions After Maher v. Roe, 7 CAP. U.L. REv. 483, 492-94 (1978).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1397i (1976).
28 To ensure a balanced program of benefits distribution, Title XIX provides general
categories of medical services under which participating states must reasonably provide re-
imbursements. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396a(a)(A)(17), 1396d(a)(i)-(v) (1976).
26 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(16) (1976).
27 The Supreme Court has noted that Title XIX does not require the funding of non-
therapeutic abortions. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 446, 446 (1977); text accompanying
notes 22 & 23 supra. However, the Court noted that the exclusion of necessary medical
procedures from coverage might raise "a serious statutory question." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
at 444. Accordingly, several courts have expressly held that Title XlX requires the funding
of medically necessary abortions. See, e.g., Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 500 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (E.D. La. 1977); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, -, 398 A.2d 587, 592 (1979) (Title XIX requires funding abor-
tions to protect woman's health). But see D_R_ v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D. Utah
1978) (life endangerment standard held to be entirely reasonable).
Title XIX's coverge of abortions has come into question recently because of annual
HEW appropriation riders, commonly referred to as Hyde Amendments, which restrict fed-
eral abortion funding. See 1977 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434
(1976) (life endangerment standard); 1978 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat.
1460 (1977) (life endangerment, rape, incest, and severe and long lasting physical health
damage standard). The effect of these appropriation riders on Medicaid funded abortions is
unclear. Compare Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 129 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 2181 (1979) (hyde substantively changed Title XIX to restrict abortion funding);
Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196, 198 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom., Miller v. Zbaraz,
48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (1980) (now pending) with Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443,
-, 398 A.2d 587, 591 (1979) (Hyde merely clarifies Title XIX). See generally Medicaid
Funding, supra note 23. State standards for reimbursement, however, may not be more
restrictive than the Hyde amendment provisions. See Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Meyers, 93 Cal. 3d 462, _, 156 Cal. Rptr. 73, 86 (1979). Twenty states have
amended their Medicaid policies to conform to the more restrictive Hyde standards. See
Medicaid, ABORTION L. RPTR. 1.08-1.030 (1979) (summarizing state standards). One com-
mentator forsees devastating health consequences arising from the recent trend towards re-
strictive funding. See Benshoof, Mobilizing for Abortion Rights, 4 Civ. LIm. REv. 76 (1977).
[Vol. XXXVII
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tics. 28 Despite the Commonwealth's assurances that the standard should
not be literally interpreted,29 the court viewed the life endangerment cri-
terion as too restrictive when measured against the program's objec-
tives.30 Accordingly, the court deemed the "substantial endangerment of
health" standard more consistent with the policy of eliminating reim-
bursement only in the case of nontherapeutic abortions.31
The new "substantial endangerment of health" standard will undoubt-
28 Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1978). In limiting the issue of the
appeal, the court found no need to invoke the doctrine of abstention as urged by the Com-
monwealth. Id. at 1365. The federal judiciary defers adjudication of a controversy to the
state courts when abstention is deemed appropriate. Id. Defendants in abortion cases often
requested abstentions since a Supreme Court ruling that abstention is proper. See Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976). However, Bellotti is unique because that case in-
volved interpretation of a state statute which hinged on the applicability of a local state
rule. In the absence of such circumstances, the courts have rejected any abstention claims
presented in abortion cases because the resultant delays could unfairly jeopardize the rights
of women who are pregnant at the time of the suits. See, e.g., Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375,
1382 n.9 (7th Cir. 19781; Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1313 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dis-
missed, 439 U.S. 8 (1978); Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (D.P.R. 1974). See
generally Abstention, ABORTON L. RPrR. 1.0 (1979).
In refusing to defer interpretation of the Board of Health policy to the Virginia courts,
the Fourth Circuit observed that the revised standard could be subject to official legislative
change. Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1363 (4th Cir. 1978).
29 Id. at 1365. Appellees maintained that the Commonwealth had the intent and desire
to fund abortions performed for good medical reasons and that the plaintiff simply misun-
derstood the policy standard. Brief for Appellees at 13, 41, Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362
(4th Cir. 1978). But see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (refusing to condone arbi-
trary policy which depended on prosecutorial policy discretion for enforcement).
3O Other courts have ruled on the ambiguity of legislative abortion standards. See Co-
lautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1978). Co-
lautti involved a challenge to a criminal abortion statute requiring certain medical tech-
niques to be employed if the fetus is or may be viable. In holding the statute ambiguous, the
court rejected the state's contention that the words "viable" .and "may be viable" conveyed
essentially the same meaning. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at
In Zbaraz, two doctors sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Illinois statute prohibit-
ing Medicaid reimbursement for abortions except those "medically necessary for the preser-
vation of life" of the pregnant woman. The Seventh Circuit found the policy standard am-
biguous since the statute lacked clarity as to which medical necessities were intended to be
covered. Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d at 584.
31 Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1978). The wording of a funding stan-
dard can have a dramatic effect on the number of abortions performed. For example, New
Jersey recently shifted from no statutory restrictions on Medicaid payments to a life endan-
germent standard. As a result, births to eligible Medicaid recipients increased thirty percent
and funded abortions decreased from nine hundred to twenty-five per month. See Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587 (1979). A similar shift in California is
projected to reduce reimbursement for abortion by ninety-five percent. See Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Meyers, 93 Cal. 3d 462, 156 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1979).
The Fourth Circuit's decision reflects the judiciary's activism in the area of indigent
rights since the revision of Commonwealth's policy standard will increase the number of
Medicaid reimbursed abortions. This trend in the protection of underrepresented interests
has developed in response to the legislatures neglect of the poor. See Wright, The Role of
the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL
L. Rav. 1 (1968); The Abortion Funding Cases, supra note 2, at 1240.
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edly broaden the scope of Medicaid abortion coverage since doctors will
be reimbursed for performing therapeutic abortions even when the preg-
nant woman's life is not endangered. Medicaid funds will now be availa-
ble to women, previously precluded by the stricter "life endangerment"
standard, who face substantial health consequences if forced to carry
pregnancy to term. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's holding may ex-
clude many medically related and necessary abortions from reimburse-
ment since the degree of medical necessity required to satisfy the "sub-
stantial endangerment of health" standard is unclear.
3 2
Medical consequences that could be described as resulting in less than
a substantial endangerment of health, such as varicose veins, hyperten-
sion, and diabetes, might not meet the court's standard for funding.33 In
addition, pregnancies which are the result of rape or incest as well as
those with the potential of producing a deformed child might be excluded
from Medicaid coverage. ' Thus, the uncertainty of coverage leads to the
conclusion that the revised standard will not be very helpful in reducing
the medical community's hesitation to perform Medicaid-funded
abortions.
The Fourth Circuit compromised between the Board of Health's strict
standard, which effectively cut off substantial numbers of therapeutic
abortions, and a standard which would provide abortions for any good
medical reason. The compromise arose out of the court's concern that in-
creased availability of abortion funding could jeopardize the fiscal struc-
ture of Virginia's Medicaid program and generate intense alienation on
the part of anti-abortion groups.3 5 The courts apprehension is under-
standable when considering that the adoption of a broader "medical ne-
32 See Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (noting ambigu-
ity in both preservation of life and preservation of health standards). The ambiguity be-
comes evident when considering whether the plaintiff's medical claim of emotional physical
difficulties satisfies the revised reimbursement standard. The plaintiff could be denied her
request for funding by failing to satisfy the substantial endangerment of health standard
even though she classified her reasons as therapeutic and consistent with the Common-
wealth's policy objective.
3 See Brief for Appellant at 5, Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978).
34 Id.
35 A large sector of the public is adamantly opposed to abortion. See 11 AKRON L. REv.
345, 357 (1977).
As a consequence, the government has attempted to maintain a neutral position on the
issue so as to minimize the alienation of anti-abortion groups who are typically seen as one
issue voters. With this in mind, the judiciary desires to preserve its own impartiality by
ruling conservatively on the abortion issue. See note 2 supra, at 937.
The cost implications of the medical necessity standard also have had an effect on abor-
tion rulings. Id. at 924. The adoption of a broader standard could place a strain on available
Medicaid funds and medical resources. Id. at 938. However, the cost implications of increas-
ing the availability of state funded abortions are not clear. In the instant case, the Board of
Health maintained that the fiscal integrity of the Commonwealth's program would be jeop-
ardized if a broad standard were adopted. Brief for Appellee at 15, 46, Doe v. Kenley, 584
F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978). But see 123 CONG. REc. FA940 (daily ed. July 28, 1977) (remarks
of Hon. Don Edwards) (citing cost and social implications of restrictive standard).
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